This paper reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric information plus competition results in insu cient insurance provision. Risk-tolerant individuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure, but are drawn into a pooling equilibrium by the low premiums createdbythepresence of safer, more risk-averse types. Taxing insurance drives out the reckless clients, allowing a strict Pareto gain. This result depends on administrative costs in processing claims and issuing policies, as does the novel nding of a pure-strategy, partial-pooling, sub-game-perfect, Nash equilibrium in the insurance market.
Introduction
Such empirical evidence as we have appears to con ict with the major implications of the standard economic model of insurance. For example, 4.8% of U.K. credit cards are reported lost or stolen each year whereas for insured cards the corresponding gure is only 2.7%. 1 In similar vein, Cawley and Philipson (1999) nd that the mortality rate of US males purchasing life insurance is below that of the uninsured, even when controlling for many factors, such as income, which are correlated with life expectancy. Chiappori and Salanie (2000) establish a methodology for such studies and report that controlling for observable characteristics known to insurers, the accident rate of young French drivers choosing comprehensive insurance is lower than for those opting for the legal minimum coverage, although the di erence is not statistically signi cant.
These ndings contradict the predictions of models of insurance markets under asymmetric information, as initiated and exempli ed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . The basic idea of models in this tradition is that the incentive to purchase insurance is greatest for those having private information that they are relatively likely to su er a loss. Augmenting this adverse-selection e ect is moral hazard, the tendency of insurance to dull the incentive to take precautions, therebyintensifying the loss propensity of the insured relativetothatoftheuninsured. This paper adopts a di erent perspective. It drops the assumption that people have identical risk preferences but di er in the level of exogenously determined risk they are exposed to. Instead, our starting point is that cautious people are not only more inclined to buy insurance, but also put more e ort into limiting risk exposure than those of a more reckless disposition. This formulation poten-tially explains the evidence that the insured are less accident prone. In addition, the standard welfare conclusion that there is insu cient insurance provision is reversed. The conventional under-insurance result arises because companies anticipate a self-selection bias and so set high premiums, making it unattractivefor good risks to take out policies, even though they would be more than willing to pay the actuarially fair price for their characteristics. In our model, the presence of cautious types lowers premiums and thus draws into the market relatively risk-tolerant, reckless types. Taxing insurance purchase drives out the bold types, eliminating a negative externality and permitting a strict Pareto gain. This result, and indeed the existence of equilibrium itself, depends on the presence of administrative costs in processing claims. These are not only realistic, but help provide away round the celebrated result of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) concerning the non-existence of pooling equilibria.
Hidden heterogeneity in risk preferences has been looked at in an insurance market with a monopoly provider by Landsberger and Meilisjon (1994) , but this set up does not yield major changes to the conclusions of the standard model. The combination of hidden preventative activity and hidden types is the potent combination and has been discussed to some extent by Pauly (1974) . More recent analyses are Stewart (1994) and Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997) , both of which explicitly examine equilibria in which agents di er with regard to the cost and e ectiveness of preventative e ort. Using a version of the Rothschild and Stiglitz model with this feature, Chassagnon and Chiappori show the existence of a positive-pro t separating equilibrium, but in their set up, sub-game perfect Nash pooling equilibria do not exist. Wambach (1997) is rather closer to our model. Exogenous, unobservable wealth di erences coexist with unobservable exogenous loss probabilities. Partialpooling equilibria are shown to arise, possibly involving positive pro ts. This is related to our existence result, though we endogenise the correlation between insurance purchase and precautionary behaviour and introduce administrative costs. Jullien, Salanie and Salanie (2000) is similar to our work in that heterogeneous risk preferences drive both precautionary action and insurance choices, although the particular preference formulation is distinct. The major distinction though is that in their model there is a single principal, in e ect monopoly provision, whereas we adopt a competitive setting. The positive results are in the same spirit as ours, but, in common with Wambach there is no welfare analysis. Monopoly involves a quite di erent set of externalities to competition and the conventional result of underprovision is to be expected.
Both our existence and our policy results depend on positive administrative costs, which are indeed signi cant in practice. Between 1985 and 1995 for UK insurers, expenses as a percentage of premium income averaged 25 per cent for motor insurance and 37 per cent for property damage insurance.
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The other key ingredient of our analysis is that precautionary e ort is positively correlated with insurance purchase. For example, controlling for observable characteristics, our approach implies that buyers of accidental death insurance are cautious types who will experience lower than average accident rates. Evidence along these lines has already been reported.
To see more explicitly how these features t together, suppose there are equal numbers of twotypes of potential client, the timid or risk averse, T, and the bold or reckless, B. The value each puts on a particular insurance policy and the cost of providing it are as shown in Table 1 . This example has the property that the bold value insurance less despite having higher expected claims.
( Table 1 . here)
Assume that the insurance industry is competitive and that an individual's type is private information. If the contract in question is the only one o ered, there is evidently a pooling equilibrium in which both types are insured and pay a premium of $75. This is despite the fact that type Bs value the policy less than the cost of providing it to these so that it would be socially e cient not to supply them. Indeed, suppose that every policy carried a tax of $22, with the proceeds distributed as a lump-sum subsidy to the whole population. There is then a separating equilibrium, with premium $82, in which only Ts are insured, but both groups are strictly better o . The Bs lose their expected surplus of $5 from the policy but gain $11 from the poll subsidy, whereas the Ts tax inclusive premium rises by $7 but they gain $11 from the poll subsidy. Everyone gains from intervention. 4 In this example there is, by assumption, only one policy and its payout is taken as given so only the premium is to be determined. Whether equilibrium policies really exist and what form they take is a notoriously delicate matter. The remainder of the paper formally demonstrates the existence of pooling, partial pooling and separating equilibria exhibiting over-insurance even when contractual form is endogenous. Tomake the case as clearly as possible, we adopt the simplest assumptions capable of yielding the novel results, but it should be clear that this stripped down speci cation is not necessary to obtain our conclusions. 4 A monopolist would charge $85, which in this example, maximises aggregate surplus.
The Model
Two justi cations are o ered for the positive correlation between insurance purchase and precautionary activity. The rst follows from heterogeneous wealth and lays the foundation for the particular form of heterogeneous tastes that constitutes our second justi cation.
Suppose, rst, that everyone has the same opportunitytolower the probability of a given nancial loss through undertaking preventative e ort. In the two-state case, the expected utility of an insured individual i is: (1) where W i is the person's wealth, D is the gross loss, y is the insurance premium and y, >0, the net of premium payout in the event of loss. F i is a binary choice variable which a ects the probabilities of loss in the same way for all individuals.
If F i = 0, the probability of avoiding the loss p (F i ) is p 0 , but if F i = F the probability rises to p F . The wealth dependent part of the utility function exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion. This standard assumption implies that the marginal rate of substitution between y and y falls with wealth. Given the magnitude and probability of loss, lower insurance coverage is therefore chosen by wealthier individuals.
The increase in expected utility from taking precautions is
It follows from decreasing absolute risk aversion that if insurance cover is partial, (D ; y > y) then @ i =@W i < 0. According to this formulation, there may be a wealth threshold above which precautions are not taken. Moreover, if admin-istrative costs or other reasons lead to high loading factors, wealthy individuals may prefer to be uninsured. Now consider a reinterpretation involving di erences in preferences. Intuitively, more timid types may lower their risk exposure through increased insurance purchase and greater precautionary e ort. However, the concept of a pure change in risk aversion is ambiguous changing the curvature of the utility function alters its height almost everywhere and the issue is, where should the pivot occur? In general results are ambiguous, but suppose that the utility function of individual i is U i = U ( i + W ) ;F i , where i is an individual-speci c parameter making taste di erences formally equivalent to wealth di erences. Just as a rich person is less likely than a poor person to take unfair insurance against the loss of $100 and to expend e ort to reduce the chance of its loss, this formulation embodies the view that`bold' people behaveasiftheywere muchwealthier than they really are. They buy less insurance and take fewer precautions than those with a more`timid' disposition. 5 In what follows we analyse market equilibrium in the heterogeneous taste formulation. Similar results apply for the heterogeneous wealth case.
Assume two types of individual, T and B, both equally wealthy. Bs have a high and so exhibit bold behaviour whilst Ts are more timid , re ecting a low : For simplicity, but without a ecting the qualitative results, wenow suppose the special case that at su ciently high + W the utility function becomes linear and Bs are in this zone of risk-neutralitywithrespect to income. In the relevant 5 Jullien, Salanie and Salanie (1999, 2000) also examine whether more risk-averse agents take more precautions. They analyse the purchase of safety enhancements whereas we consider individuals' choice of precautionary e ort. In either case, general results are ambiguous, so the question must ultimately be resolved empirically. The formulation that a poor but risk tolerant individual behaves in the same wayasawealthier but more risk averse person, does yield the intuitive result. range, the utility functions are:
where U B is linear and U T is strictly concave and W ; y W ; D + y are the wealth levels in the good and bad states. 6 Given the formulation in (3), the expected utility from taking precautions is: (4) There are at least two insurance companies and they incur a strictly positive processing cost, C per claim handled.
Stage 1 Insurance companies make irrevocable o ers of contracts that specify premium y,andpayout y in the event of loss.
Stage 2 Clients apply for at most one contract from one insurance company. If two insurance companies o er the same contract, clients toss a fair coin to decide between them. In the light of the contract chosen, the client decides whether to take unobservable precautions.
In what follows we only consider pure-strategy, sub-game-perfect, Nash equilibria. Depending on parameter values, separating, full-pooling and partial-pooling equilibria are possible. We begin by outlining the requirements for the various kinds of equilibria.
Separating Equilibrium
A separating equilibrium involves the Ts and Bs ending up with distinct allocations, z T and z B respectively. Such an equilibrium must satisfy the following:
(a) Incentive compatibility:
(6a) (b) E ort incentives:
with i de ned in (4).
(c) Participation: For each type i = B T if they buy insurance, the contract they subscribe to is at least as good as the null contract, z 0,
Given the contracts o ered by the other companies, no company can increase its expected pro t byvarying the terms of the contracts it o ers, or by not o ering a contract at all.
Pooling Equilibrium
In a full-pooling equilibrium only the contract z p o ered and everybody buys it. In a partial-pooling equilibrium, z p attracts at least some of each type of agent but not everyone in the population buys it. Of those applying for z p , a proportion are of type T . In both cases, the equilibrium satis es the following:
(a) E ort incentives:
(b) Participation: For both types, z p is at least as good as the null contract, z 0 ,
In the partial pooling case 7(b) must hold with equality for at least one group. (c) Pro t maximisation: Given that z p is o ered by other companies, no company can increase its expected pro t byintroducing a di erentcontract or by not o ering a contract at all.
Anatomy of Equilibria
It is easiest to proceed diagrammatically. In all the gures, the individuals' wealth- Bs, we normalise so their utility of income equals income, and assume that at the endowment point, precautions increase expected wealth and hence utilityby less than F . Hence, Bs never take precautions.
Indi erence curves are drawn in income space assuming the optimal level of precautions is chosen. It follows that the indi erence curves of the Ts labelled I T , are kinked where they cross PP 0 . Above PP 0 the loss probability is raised so the indi erence curves atten. EE 0 is an indi erence curveofaB, which is linear since the Bs are risk neutral and F is su ciently high that in the relevant range they never take precautions.
The location of the insurers' zero-pro t o er curves depends on the level of administrative costs, C . When all applicants take precautions, the zero-pro t o er curve is JJ 0 , and JM 0 is the full-pooling o er curve given that the Ts take precautions and the Bs do not. Finally, JN 0 is the o er curve when no applicant takes precautions. The reason that J lies below E is the need to cover processing costs.
In identifying equilibria, it is evident that, when the administrative cost is su ciently high, insurance is not viable and all agents remain at their endowment point. We show that at lower levels of C a separating equilibrium exists. As C falls further, partial-pooling emerges as an equilibrium.
The propositions which follow displayhow the nature of equilibrium depends on C: To conserve space and a sense of proportion, not every case is dealt with. In all that follows we assume that even though the Ts take steps to limit their risk exposure, at E their indi erence curve is atter than that of a B not taking precautions:
Assumption A1 is required for a partial-pooling equilibrium. 8 We start with the con guration yielding a partial-pooling equilibrium in which those who take precautions subsidise the entry of those who do not. 9 The numbers of Ts and Bs buying insurance policies is thus determined endogenously and 8 The full analysis of this case is available from the authors. 9 Dionne and Doherty (1994) cast doubt on the extent of cross-subsidisation in insurance markets by observing the multiplicity of premia o ers in the Californian automobile insurance market Puelz and Snow (1994) obtain similar results for Georgia. However, if there is double crossing of indi erence curves, as here, existence of even a continuum of o ers mayinvolve the same choice made by di erenttypes. depends upon the cross-subsidy implied by the insurance contract relative to the expected administrativecostof insurance.
As the model is presently speci ed, there is potentially a continuum of positivepro t partial-pooling equilibria (see also Wambach (1997) ). This is an artifact of the discreteness of the model and occurs if there are pooling o ers at whichtheBs are indi erentbetween purchase and remaining at E. Suppose that all companies o er a contract which is zero pro t when taken by all Ts and Bs: The Bs are indi erent as to whether they purchase and suppose only some of the Bs choose to do so. Positive pro ts would then be earned by the contract. Nevertheless, no insurer would undercut by an epsilon, for the consequence is that all the Bs then strictly prefer to purchase and their high claim rate eliminates pro ts. This knife-edge feature re ects an extreme but inessential modelling assumption and is not of central economic interest. To ensure that only zero-pro t equilibria emerge, the model is modi ed to introduce some vanishingly small heterogeneitybetween agents of each type: (A2) Eachagent i has a utility cost " i in applying for a policy. The distribution of " i in the population is continuous with support 0 "] where " is arbitrarily small.
The " could be thought of as the e ort cost of lling in a proposal form. The role of the "s is to remove the discontinuity in the best-response functions and so eliminate positive-pro t equilibria. 10 In all the equilibria we examine, the Ts are strictly better o if they purchase insurance so the "s have no e ect on their decisions. equilibrium. The equilibrium insurance contract, z p is partial-pooling and located above but arbitrarily close to X: 11 More precisely, the contract maximises the utility of the Ts subject to the insurers attracting the number of Bs required for breakeven. It is therefore located at the tangency between a T and B indi erence curve, just above X . 12 Proof. It is trivial that z p is an equilibrium. All Ts are strictly better o if they take z p rather than going uninsured, whilst the fraction of Bs preferring z p to E is just enough to render z p zero pro t granted that only Ts In the interval de ned in Proposition 1, the insurance contract is e ectively invariant to the level of C but the lower is C the more Bs are insured. 11 The contract actually at X is not an equilibrium. No Bs purchase due to the application cost but as X lies below JJ 0 , it is strictly pro table. An insurer would therefore gain by making a slightly more generous o er that captures all the Ts even though a few extra Bs also purchase. 12 Eliminating the undercutting incentivemust involve a zero-pro t o er and so involve some but not all Bs participating (since JM 0 lies below X ). As the distribution of " is compressed, this equilibrium is arbitrarily close to X. Just enough Bs buy the contract to render zero expected pro t for the insurance company (so the contract satis es 7(a)) and the tangency occurs an epsilon above X. Notice that separation is achieved with the Ts under-insured relative to the equilibrium with full information about types. Also, this zone has the counterintuitiveproperty that the lower is C , the less insurance coverage taken by Ts. 14 ( Figure 3 . here)
Now suppose that C exceeds the interval identi ed in Proposition 2 but is still not prohibitive. As illustrated in Figure 3 When administrative costs are low it becomes an issue whether a pure-strategy sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium exists. Consider rst the con guration of Figure 1 where Proposition 1 establishes that a partial pooling equilibrium exists at X . Now let C fall so that J slides up E H . There is some threshold value of C below which JM 0 still passes below X but cuts I T below PP 0 (when JM 0 passes through X it certainly cuts I T ). In this zone, there is no equilibrium. There will be some o ers along JM 0 that are better for Ts than X , and so break the partial pooling o er (which in turn breaks full pooling at the intersection of To summarise, the comparative statics of our model as the administration cost, C , changes are as follows. At very high values of C no insurance is purchased. As C falls, a zone is entered in which separating equilibria exist. Here, the Bs do not purchase insurance and the Ts take either full or partial insurance. As C falls further, partial-pooling emerges and nally, for C su ciently low, there exists no sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. 16 Finally, we sketch outcomes when there is no tangency between the Ts' indi erence curve and EE 16 Existence can always be restored if the equilibrium concept is Wilson rather than Nash (see Wilson (1977) ). This is not a novel observation, the interest being that, using arguments along the lines of those in Section 3, such equilibria can be shown to exhibit excessivecoverage. Looking to the most interesting cases, the existence of zero-pro t partial or full pooling equilibria depends upon the marginal buyer being the boldest and highest risk of those active. In our formulation, zero pro t can be achieved with incomplete participation by the marginal types. What allows pooling is the double crossing of indi erence curves, which becomes possible once precautions are endogenous. In a pooling con guration, a small cut in the premium or alteration in coverage causes a ood of bold entrants, taking no precautions, and therefore is unpro table. The conventional model sees a cut in the premium leading to an in ux of good risks and it thus yields an increase in pro t, thereby precluding a partial-pooling equilibrium.
Just as in the conventional model, separating equilibria may also arise. This occurs when there is single crossing, or, as in Proposition 2, if double crossing does not apply in the relevant zone. The di erence with the standard model is that here the good risks make their contracts undesirable to the bad risks by raising coverage from the full information level. 18 
Welfare
In our set up, it is possible to nd policies that yield strict Pareto gains. Consider the equilibrium of Proposition 1 in which entry of the Bs has taken place up to the point at which they gain no surplus from insurance and some, but not all, are uninsured. (Figure 4 . here) Proposition 3. In the partial-pooling equilibrium of Proposition 1, introducing a small xed tax per policy issued, with the proceeds returned as a lump-sum subsidy to the whole population, yields a strict Pareto improvement. Note that the premium per dollar of coverage remains the same despite the tax. This is possible since fewer higher risk Bs are insured. Also, for a su ciently large tax, the pooling equilibrium breaks down and separation results.
If the laissez-faire equilibrium is separating, as in Proposition 2, the possibility of a strict Pareto improvement again arises. The tax makes it less attractive for the Bs to purchase insurance and so allows the Ts to achieve separation with increased insurance coverage. More speci cally, the tax on each policy and return of the proceeds as a poll subsidy slides the zero coverage contract, J down the 
Substituting (10) into (11) 
Using (8) and (12) (14) The left hand side of (14) is the absolute value of the slope of Ts indi erence curve at E. The slope of the locus of intersections generated by balanced-budget variations of the tax is given by the term on the right hand side of (14) The reason the tax is more e ective when there are few Bs is that the per capita subsidy is then high and so there is a large e ect on the utility of the uninsured Bs and hence also on the Ts:
Conclusions
Unlike the standard insurance model, the formulation developed here may yield a unique, sub-game perfect, partial-pooling, Nash equilibrium with the property that insurance market failure may be in the direction of excessive provision. Separating equilibria with this property are also possible. The key to these results is that, as premiums rise, it is the least risk-averse types who drop out of the market, the very people most inclined to reckless behaviour. Thus, the marginal purchasers impose an externality on the other buyers and it would be better if they were not in the market. Indeed, there exist feasible schemes which make everyone better o . The argument was made explicit using the simplest model possible, but is clearly more general.
Casual observation does suggest that the worst risks often do without insurance, whereas in the standard model it is the good risks that are not covered. The evidence cited in the Introduction that the insured are less likely to su er losses is consistent with this view. 19 Chiappori and Salanie (2000) nd though that the accident rate of drivers choosing comprehensive insurance is not signicantly di erent from those opting for the legal minimum of third-partycoverage. Although our model implies that the comprehensively insured have the lowest accident rates, minor modi cation allows for equality. Comprehensive insurance allows claims to be made for contingencies not covered by a third party policy, and so entails higher expected administrative costs which, in our analysis, can be represented by C. In a partial-pooling equilibrium, some bold types purchase comprehensive policies and others opt for the third-partycoverage. Due to moral hazard, selecting a comprehensive policy induces fewer precautions than if third party coverage is chosen. 20 So, comprehensive insurance is taken by the safest drivers of all, the timid, and also by those with the very worst accident rates, bold types with no incentive to take care. Average accident rates may thus be the same for holders of the two policies. Whereas the Rothschild and Stiglitz model of adverse selection is inconsistent with Chiappori and Salanie's ndings, the more so if moral hazard is added, advantageous selection plus moral hazard does potentially account for them.
Cawley and Philipson (1999) also report the striking observation that insurance premiums display quantity discounts, the opposite of the prediction of the standard model in which those buying the most insurance are the bad risks. In our model, the bold types are risk neutral so, in the absence of intervention, in a separating equilibrium they do not buy insurance at all. If, instead, we assumed that the bold, though more risk tolerant than the timid types, were nevertheless risk averse, separation may involve both types buying some insurance. The bold types purchase less coverage and take fewer precautions, so breakeven premiums on their policies must involve a higher loading factor. Even without xed administrative costs, aquantity discount emerges.
The key to our resolution of the puzzling empirical features of insurance markets is that people who are reluctant to purchase insurance are also reluctant to take precautions. We argued that heterogeneous risk preference with endogenous precautionary e ort could lead to just such a correlation. Other explanations are possible. 21 There is a wealth of psychological evidence that people tend to be unrealistically optimistic concerning the probability of su ering losses, particularly when events are perceived as under the individual's control. 22 Indeed, Adam Smith regarded the failure of people to take out insurance as the result of thoughtlessness rashness and presumptuous contempt of risk (Wealth of Nations Book 1, Ch. X). It is easily seen that such unrealistic optimists will be less inclined to purchase insurance and even if they do so they may well take fewer precautions.
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The positive results of the paper hold for this case, but of course 21 Similar results apply evenifthereisnocausallinkbetween risk attitudes and loss propensity. For example, it could be that there is no moral hazard but clumsy people happen to be the least risk averse. Thereisnoobvious reason why this should be so, nor even stylized evidence in favour.
22 Weinstein (1980) is the seminal reference. For a more recent survey see Weinstein and Klein (1996) . For applications to economics see Roll (1986) , de Meza and Southey (1996) and Manove and Padilla (1999) 23 Rutter, Quine and Alberry (1998) nd that motorcyclists are generally prone to overoptimism concerning the chance of accident but there is no clear tendency for those taking the most safety precautions to perceivelower absolute risks. This suggests that the most reckless riders are optimists.
the welfare results are reversed now the equilibrium involves too little insurance. Consider the implications if unrealistic optimism is heterogeneously distributed. The most optimistic types will tend to be the least willing to purchase insurance. It is also possible that an attitude of`it won't happen to me' is a discouragement to take precautions. A misperception that risks are already low means a belief that few precautions are necessary is an attitude whichmay be reinforced byoverestimation of the e cacy of what actions are taken. The net result is similar to heterogeneous risk preferences the marginal insurance buyers are the riskiest of all and separating and pooling equilibria paralleling those analysed here may emerge. The major di erence concerns policy. Optimism implies a mistaken reluctance to purchase insurance. The cross subsidy whichdraws in marginal types maynowbe insu cient to o set the cognitive bias that leads to underinsurance where there are no hidden types. The policy analysis is by no means straightforward and we do not pursue it here. 24 Finally, although our discussion has been in terms of insurance markets, other agency problems have similar features. The design of managerial compensation schemes, corporate nance issues, and selection into self employment may be fruitful applications of the approach. 
